SYARIKAT AND THE MOVE TO MAKE AMENDS FOR THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA'S VIOLENT PAST 1
Following the 1965 coup attempt against the top army leadership, the Indonesian military orchestrated and participated in killing members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its affiliated organisations, military men sympathetic to the PKI and Sukarno supporters. Approximately 500,000 people died. The largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, meaning awakening of the ulama) supported this violence and some of its members also participated in the killing. For the duration of the New Order regime members of the NU represented, and sometimes celebrated, their participation in this violence as service to the nation. Together with the Indonesian military they had a joint interest in sustaining the cornerstone of New Order ideology, anti-communism. Yet in 2000, just two years after the fall of the Suharto regime, young members of the NU formed an organisation named Syarikat (Masyarakat Santri untuk Advokasi Rakyat-Santri Society for People's Advocacy) aimed specifically at re-examining the NU's role in this violence and improving relations between members of the NU and former leftists.
This article explains the reason for this dramatic move and critically examines how Syarikat have fared in the larger project of reconciliation politics in post-Suharto Indonesia. Firstly I examine the NU's support for and participation in the 1965-66 killings and how this history was recorded in NU publications. I then turn to analysing the conditions that brought about Syarikat alongside a strong tradition of anti-communism in the NU. I analyse Syarikat's aims and achievements and probe some tensions between their joint aims of advocacy for victims and producing new versions of history. Finally I reflect on responses to Syarikat. Their decision to confront one of the most delicate topics in the history of the NU has, as we shall see, had a mixed reception from within the NU. These responses provide an important barometer of the extent of commitment to reform and tolerance within the NU.
Responses to Syarikat also provide some indication of the constraints on human rights advocacy in contemporary Indonesia. Edward Aspinall suggests that immediately after the Suharto regime, with the commencement of the Habibie Presidency in 1998, 'ideas about political and social order generated in the vanguard elements of civil society (such as human rights NGOs) over the previous decade were accepted as an ideological foundation for the new political order '. 2 This comment now seems overly optimistic. In the ten years since the end of the Suharto regime there has been a dramatic increase in media attention to human rights abuses and increased advocacy for justice for instances of violence during the New Order period including the 1965 killings, the Tanjung Priok incident, the Mysterious Killings, Talangsari, Aceh, West Papua and the May 1998 riots. There have also been some state level initiatives to address selective cases of past human rights abuses including fact finding teams in the case of May 1998 and limited investigations by the National Commission on Human Rights into the Buru Island prisoners, East Timor, Aceh and Tanjung Priok. 3 Further to this in 1999 the Indonesian parliament passed a new law on Human Rights and in 2001 a new law on human rights courts, both of which paved the way for Ad Hoc Human Rights courts to deal with both Tanjung Priok and the 1999 atrocities in East Timor. 4 Both these trials, however, failed to convict top ranking military officers. In 2004 the parliament passed a law enabling the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono began to consider a list of potential commissioners, but the commission was abandoned in 2006 after the Constitutional Court declared the TRC law as unconstitutional. 5 Although there has been more attention to human rights and some investigations of human rights abuses, the continuing influence of the Indonesian military, despite a formal withdrawal from politics, and the limited capacity of Indonesian courts to uphold the rule of law have stifled significant progress and resulted in a continuing culture of impunity for human rights violators.
Particular cases of human rights abuses have received more traction that others. Some progress was made in the East Timor case, largely due to external pressure, and in the Tanjung Priok case, due to the lobbying power of Islamic parties in the post-Suharto period. The 1965 killings, however, remain one of the most highly contested cases. The government is reluctant to address this past because there is no shared consensus that the New Order, especially its inception, was a shameful period in Indonesian history. Each time NGOs or survivors have attempted to make a public attempt to open this past or stake claims for justice and historical revisions, protests and other cases direct intimidation or violence have followed. One reason for this is that in the case of 1965 it is not just the Indonesian military that stand to lose from opening this past. Resistance to efforts to re-examine the 1965 killings, stem in part from those who participated in the violence, but also from competing visions about Indonesian Islam and pluralism.
BACKGROUND TO THE VIOLENCE AND THE ROLE OF THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA
Early in the hours of 1 October 1965, members of an armed group calling itself the 30 September Movement (G30S) kidnapped and killed six army Generals and one lieutenant general, dumping their corpses in a disused well in East Jakarta. In the latest scholarly interpretation of the coup attempt, Roosa argues that sections of the PKI, such as the Special Bureau led by Sjam Kamaruzzaman and directed by PKI Chairman, D.N. Aidit had a role in the coup plot, but other members of the party leadership were not involved. 6 Some members of these organisations were on stand-by to mobilise for some kind of upcoming action, but they were unaware of the planned action against the military. Asia, Vol. 37, No. 1, February 2007, pp. 80-83 5 This decision by the Constitutional Court was the result of a request for review by several human rights NGOs and individuals who were critical of the TRC's proposed amnesty provisions. A second request for review was filed by interest groups who stood to lose from investigations into past human rights abuses, but this request was denied. These interest groups did lobby the Court heavily to cast out the TRC law, hence ending any immediate prospects for the formation of a TRC. In the 1960s the Nahdlatul Ulama was an active political party and it negotiated the demands of Sukarno's Nasakom policy delicately. All political parties were required to demonstrate support for the joint alliance of nationalist, religious and communist forces. This, however, sat uneasily with more militant members of the NU and they became increasingly discontented with what they saw were advances by the PKI. In response, members of the youth wing of the NU, Ansor founded Banser (Barisan SerbagunaMultipurpose Brigade) an armed wing in preparation for confrontation with the PKI. 8 Prior to the 1965 coup attempt members of Banser had already clashed with members of the PKI affiliated Indonesian Farmers' Union (Barisan Tani Indonesia, BTI) in land reform actions.
9
Members of the NU who lived through the 1960s and some of their children continue to claim that they were mocked by the PKI in references to kiai or Islamic religious teachers as one of the seven categories of 'village devils' due to their land holdings. In addition they claim that members of the People's Cultural Institute (LEKRA-Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat) the cultural wing of the PKI, frequently performed an insulting Javanese folk theatre performance entitled the Death of God (Matinya Gusti Allah).
10
When the 1965 coup attempt occurred, young militants in the NU pushed the leadership to quickly back the Indonesian army in blaming the communists for the coup attempt and calling for a ban on the party.
11 They were one of the first organisations to stand openly against the communists. In their official statement on the 5 th October 1965, the leaders of the NU Party stated those involved in the coup attempt must be 'quickly eliminated down to the roots to safeguard the path of the revolution'.
12 On 30 October, Ansor issued an instruction to all members to heighten their vigilance and 'help ABRI in any way they could to restore order, guard the integrity of the nation and save the revolution'. 13 The instruction also stated that in efforts to crush the 30th September Movement, members of Ansor should wait and only carry out the instructions from NU co-ordinators who had already been assigned at the national level and who would be selected in the regions by leaders of the party.
14 This last instruction alludes to plans for close co-ordination of this campaign by the central Ansor leadership.
It is difficult to find direct instructions from the NU to its members to assist the military by killings communists. The instructions were probably carefully worded given Sukarno was still president at the time and unwilling to blame the communist party for the coup attempt. Yet there are some signs of direct endorsement from the NU for the violence. In correspondence, for example, with the Pekalongan branch of Ansor, the NU Central Board 8 Greg Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama: Sejarah NU 1952 -1967 , LKiS, Yogyakarta, 1998 Ibid, pp. 320-25. Fealy, 1998, pp. 328-332. 12 Nahdlatul Ulama, Pernyataan Pengurus Besar Partai Nahdlatul Ulama Berserat Segenap OrmasOrmasnya, copy thanked them for their report on efforts to crush G3OS. 15 They also suggested that if any NU men became victims, whether kidnapped or 'killed in the battle' a report should be filed with their name and address and position and family details and an explanation of how they died, such that appropriate merit would be bestowed upon them as a syahid (Islamic martyr).
16 By January 1966 the NU leadership was willing to endorse a booklet entitled Guidebook for Indoctrination to Eliminate the Thinking of PKI/Gestapu, in which the editor claimed it was a form of worship (ibadah) to crush the PKI and that 'the PKI must be wiped out from the face of Indonesia and never given the chance to exist again '. 17 In the months after the coup attempt, members of Banser mobilised with varying degrees of military assistance and direction and rounded up and killed members of leftist organisations. There are several primary accounts of NU members' roles in this violence 18 in addition to several scholarly analyses. Sulistyo and Sudjatmoko canvas Ansor's roles in the killings in Jombang, Kediri and Magetan in East Java, and in Bali concluding that in Kediri, there was greater military direction. 19 Hefner details the role of Ansor in the Tengger Highlands in East Java, where they came from the lowlands and worked together with the army to carry out purges of PKI members. 20 Robinson also mentions in passing a more minor role played by Ansor in Bali.
21
The NU was not the only civilian organisation involved in the killings. Other Islamic groups such as the Muhammadiyah and also Catholic and Christian organisations joined together with the military and secular nationalist organisations, to carry out the killings.
22
Commenting on Bali, Robinson importantly notes that although religion was often used as justification for the killing, the military 'actively shaped and encouraged a popular discourse of anti-communism based on exacting religious ideas and cultural analogies'. 23 Studies, 1990 , pp. 169-176. Pipit Rochijat, 'Am I PKI or Non-PKI?. Indonesia. No. 40, 1985 For details on the killings in Jombang and Kediri, see Hermawan Sulistyo, Palu arit di ladang tebu: sejarah pembantaian massal yang terlupakan (Jombang-Kediri 1965 -1966 On the role of Catholic organizations, especially in Eastern Indonesia see Farram, 'Revolution, Religion and Magic The PKI in West Timor, 1924 -1966 ', Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land en Volkenkunde, v. 58, 2002 , pp 21-48. Webb, 1986 . On the role of PNI vigilantes in the violence, see Robinson, 1995, p. 300 and in contrast, how in some instances, PNI member also became the victims of killings by Ansor, see Hefner, 1990, p. 211. 23 Robinson, 1995, p. 279. those who directed their members to participate in the violence were driven primarily by political, rather than religious considerations. 27 Fealy suggests that in the clashes between communists and more devout Muslims (santri), some estimate around 8000 people, mostly communists died.
28
These publications appeared shortly after the end of the Cold War and paralleled military efforts to revive the communist threat with a new emphasis on anti-communism and links to religious piety. 29 This was in part a response to waning belief in the communist threat, but also concerns about increased emphasis in society on human rights as evidenced by the creation of a National Human Rights Commission in 1993. In 1996, for example, Sunyoto coauthored another publication Banser undertakes Jihad to Crush the PKI, 30 which is devoted 24 Cribb, 'Unresolved Problems in the Indonesian Killings of 1965 -1966 ', Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 4. 2002 Menangkan Pembangunan Menangkan Keadilan dan Kebenaran, Lembaga Pendidikan Maaruf NU, 1971. 26 Choirul Anam , Gerak Langkah Pemuda Ansor: Sebuah Percikan Sejarah Kelahiran, Majalah Nahdlatul Ulama AULA, Surabaya, 1990, p. 92. 27 George, Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1952, p. 300. 28 Fealy, 1998, p. 313, n. 24. 29 See entirely to clarifying Banser's role in crushing the communists in response to military objections to accusations that only they were responsible for the killings. 31 The military and the NU were already anticipating a re-opening of this past.
CHANGING IDEAS AND APPROACHES IN THE NU 1984-1998
Within the NU radically different views on human rights and pluralism had also developed in the later years of the New Order amongst its younger members. Since the Situbondo Congress decision of 1984 to withdraw from politics, the NU had undergone a partial revolution. 32 In the early 1980s, leaders within NU decided to return to the khittah (the original NU mission) as a religious organisation focusing on cultural and educational tasks because they felt they there was no more room to move within the political sphere, especially within the only Islamic party PPP, the United Development Party in which they felt NU leaders had been marginalised. NU elder Kiai Muchith Muzadi also claims that this move was an effort to placate the New Order regime, which was fearful of the support base of the NU. 33 Although political interests drove the decision to return to the khittah, this process brought about a reorientation within NU and created new spaces for younger members of NU.
In his 1979 work, Khitthah Nahdliyah, Kiai Achmad Siddiq suggested the core NU values were tawassuth (moderation, keeping to the middle road) and the aim of rahmatan lil alamin (compassion and kindness towards the entire world), with the exception of the implacable enemies of Islam. He also emphasized education, charity and economic activities.
34
Reformists like Abdurrahman Wahid tried to formulate more specific recommendations concerning the path the NU should take and emphasized charitable work and social solidarity as another form of worship (ibadah), thus widening the definition of worship from personal observance.
35 Abdurrahman Wahid was elected NU chairman-general in 1984 and re-elected again in 1989 and 1994. During this time, Wahid oversaw and encouraged many new initiatives in the NU, with varied responses from more conservative ulama. Abdurrahman Wahid's support for a return to the khittah was not driven purely by a new vision. He claimed in fact that NU 'left politics to play better politics' 36 .
Young members within NU welcomed the return to the khittah, because they felt the emphasis on elite political struggle during the past decades had led to neglect of the NU's educational role and its responsibility for the welfare of its followers. 37 As opposed to the older members of the NU who were more focused on the pesantren world, the new generation within the NU that coincided with the return to the khittah were more exposed to modern 31 Ibid, p.ii. 32 These developments have been covered most comprehensively by van Bruinessen, 1996, pp. 163-189. 33 Muchith education and more receptive to new ideas and social theories. 38 This was especially true of those active in NGOs. The young people who became followers of the reformers were mostly from educational institutions, especially pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) and madrasah (Islamic schools), but also the State Institutes of Islamic Studies (IAIN) and other higher education organisations. In their student years, these young intellectuals were the leaders and activists in organizations which for the most part were affiliated with the NU, like Indonesian Islamic Student's Movement (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, PMII), the Women's Corps of PMII, Fatayat and Ansor. In the 1980s they were active in study groups within and outside of the NU. These were important organizations for the discussion of social political issues.
39
Apart from being inspired by the thoughts and writings of Abdurrahman Wahid and his emphasis on humanitarianism and civil society, young members of the NU were influenced by wide sources of thought including the prolific writer Hassan Hanafi, an Egyptian philosopher who offered new liberal perspectives on Islam. In the 1990s their discussions focused on the backwardness of the Third World, economic justice and human rights, including and the rights of women in Islam. 40 The emergence of discourses on democracy, respect for human rights, gender equality, also reflected an effort to critique the New Order. There was a boom in Islamic literature canvassing these ideas. At the forefront of such publications was LKiS (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial, the Institute for Islamic and Social Studies) a Yogyakarta-based group founded by members of the NU with the aim of spreading tolerant and transformative Islam. Thousands of students received LKiS training as social activists and went on to form their own NGOs.
41
To spread these ideas, young members of the NU held training programs in big cities, as well as for students and teachers in village-based pesantren. The prominent representative of liberal Islam, Ulil Absar Abdalla a founder of the NU Institute for Research and Development of Human Resources (Lakspesdam NU) and now head of the Islamic Liberal Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal) notes, however, that his generation experienced general resistance and difficulty in spreading some of these ideas in pesantren circles. Moreover young NU members frequently had to ask Abdurrahman Wahid to intervene to convince the kiai to allow the training to take place in their pesantren. 42 So it seems that there were already significant differences about how far the reform process, which began in 1984 should be taken. Prasetyo, 2002, pp. 195-196, 200-201 .
THE FOUNDING OF SYARIKAT
When the Suharto regime finally ended in May 1998, there was a sense of euphoria in particular amongst members of the younger generation in Indonesia. Some NU activists were already involved with the NU linked organisations such as P3M (Perhimpunan Pesantren dan Masyarakat, Association for the Development of Pesantren and Society), LKiS and Lakpesdam NU that addressed human rights concerns less directly through the promotion of the discourse of human rights, but the fall of Suharto presented new possibilities for actively addressing past abuses. Due to the end of press censorship and interest among the public, there was also intense media coverage from late 1998 through to 2000 concerning the long banned topics of the events of the 1965 coup attempt and eventually the killings. Information about the coup attempt and alternative theories to the government view had been tightly controlled for over thirty years and, in a climate of strong anti-communism, coverage of the plight of victims of anti-communist violence had been minimal.
Because of this newly created space for the discussion of history and increased public attention to human rights abuses during the Suharto period some members of Ansor, who had been active in the reform movement of 1997-98, began to grapple with the issue of how to deal with the stigma associated with Ansor's past. Martin van Bruinessen notes that this stigma was not confined to groups outside of the NU, even the NU-based student group PMII were somewhat dismissive of Ansor and Ansor's paramilitary wing Banser, because of the legacy of 1965-66. 43 One Syarikat researcher, Taufiqurrahman, spoke of the burden he felt he bore as a member of the younger generation of Ansor. 44 Another researcher commented to me that after the fall of Suharto, perhaps as more information became public about the killings, this stigma became stronger especially in activist circles.
Between 1998 and 1999, for example, victim's formed various organizations such as YPKP (The Foundation for the Research into Victims of the 1965-66 Killings), to investigate both the killings and widespread detainments of prisoners in 1965. Former political prisoners also began to publish their memoirs detailing the extremes of suffering they endured both within gaol and once released. 45 Newspaper and television coverage of the killings also increased.
46
In an attempt to establish a new image from that of his official backer and predecessor, Suharto, President Habibie also paid greater attention to human rights abuses by releasing most remaining political prisoners. In relation to 1965 his government promised to review the official version of the coup attempt in school textbooks and it discontinued the once compulsory screening of the annual propaganda film Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI A pressing question for Ansor members was how they could join in the democratisation process if their organisation was involved in human rights crimes in the 1960s. 47 In the 1999 NU Congress in Kediri members of the NU decided, in the new climate of reform, they should engage in repentance (taubat) and utterances for God's forgiveness (istiqfar) . 48 This call was not made specifically with reference to 1965, 49 but in the same year NU activists from eighteen towns met to discuss the effects of the 1965 tragedy on Ansor and Banser. Their aim was to try to challenge the stigma of the NU and the PKI as enemies by commencing with research into the role of NU people in the killings. They were further encouraged when in 2000 Abdurrahman Wahid, who was by then president proposed that the 1966 ban on communism be lifted. Wahid also offered a personal apology to victims of the violence of 1965. This caused outrage amongst some Islamic groups, 50 but it became a source of inspiration for some young activists in the NU. The Yogyakarta branch of Ansor followed Wahid's lead and also offered and apology to victims of the violence of 1965.
51 Then in December 2000, on International Human Rights Day, NU activists from eighteen towns in Java founded Syarikat. From this point onwards Syarikat, whose central branch is in Yogyakarta, has maintained a network of partner organisations across Java that conduct research on 1965, develop links with survivors of the violence of 1965 and run programs centred around these survivors. Members of the network meet several times a year to discuss future programs and report on activities.
52
The background of Syarikat founder and director Imam Aziz, highlights the links between Syarikat and the generation within NU that was most strongly shaped the process of reform in NU following the return to the khittah. Aziz is not an Ansor member, but a former PMII activist. This suggests that those within Syarikat represent more of a network across those supportive of change in Ansor in general and wider circles of NU activists. Aziz is a graduate from State Islamic Institute Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta. He was involved in setting up LKiS together with other Yogyakarta IAIN students.
53 Before working at Syarikat he also worked for Lakpesdam NU. In 1997 Lakpesdam commenced grassroots human rights training in the pesantren, which also provided a stimulus for Aziz's focus on 1965. 54 Most researchers in Syarikat are aged in their thirties or forties and were thus born after the violence of 1965. In addition to the desire to both confront and remake Ansor and NU's image, their motivations for joining Syarikat also stem from compassion for survivors of the violence, including many people who were imprisoned without trial for long periods following the coup attempt. This is consistent with the larger spirit of reform within the NU For analysis of these responses see Purwadi ,2003 , pp. 59-67 and Kasemin, Mendamaikan Sejarah: Analisis Wacana Pencabutan TAP MPRS/Xxv/1966 , LKiS, Yogyakarta, 2004 Said, 2000 accessed from http:www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2000/11/29/0006.html.
The current member organizations include Syarikat Yogyakarta, Salatiga and Probolinggo, Lakpesdam branches in Jakarta, Cirebon, Cilacap, Blitar, Klaten, Pasuran and Banyuwangi, P3M Jakarta, Incres Banding, Indipt Kebumen, Kolmaster Wonosobo, LKiS Yogyakarta,LKTS Boyolali, Gapura Blora, FSAS Jepara, Alur Batang, Lepim Kediri and SD Inpers Jember. 53 Miichi, 2003, p. 22. 54 Chloe Olliver, 'Reconciling NU and the PKI '. Inside Indonesia, No. 77, Jan-March, 2004, pp. 24-25. and a focus on charitable work and vulnerable groups. They are also no doubt driven by a desire to project a different vision of Indonesian Islam for the future alongside the development of multiple and competing versions of Islam in the post-Suharto era.
Another product of increased political and media freedom in the post-Suharto era has been the emergence of new Islamic parties and interest groups including Islamists who felt greatly aggrieved by the New Order regime. Some Islamist groups have also used opportunities in the last decade to redefine Islamic values and to launch critiques of 'liberal' values. Syarikat are working to sustain a focus on charitable and human rights work, but their mission also encompasses a strong commitment to pluralism as evidenced by their outreach to a long marginalised group of people.
When researchers in the Syarikat network, which now extends to twenty-six towns across Java, commenced interviews with a number of survivors of the violence typically those who had been imprisoned, many were surprised to learn of how much people had suffered and of the violence that occurred. 55 These new narratives about 1965 conflicted dramatically with what they had been told in New Order history classes.
Syarikat describes its activities as grassroots based, because it draws on the wide existing network of NU followers, pesantrens and organizations. For this reason they have focused on fairly small scale initiatives. Recognising the sensitivity of their work, they aim for slow and gradual change with out being confrontational. Cordaid, a Catholic relief and development aid organisation, based in The Hague in the Netherlands have financially supported Syarikat to date. According to their promotional literature, Cordaid suggests they primarily support civil society organisations that have a wide social basis of support or broad networks to draw upon. 56 They stress support for civil society organisations that 'include vulnerable groups strengthen social cohesion and produce social capital'. 57 One tension in Syarikat's work, however, is that their broad basis of support from which they seek to build social cohesion is the wider circles of NU for whom their work remains controversial. In this sense as Martin van Bruinessen notes, by forging links with former political prisoners, Syarikat have prioritised the accumulation of bridging capital, meaning intra group cohesion, over bonding capital meaning internal group cohesion.
58 Forging links with former political prisoners was not an easy process and for this reason it has been difficult to meet Cordaid's demands.
One activist in Lakpesdam Blitar reflected that it took some time to build bonds of trust between them as young members of the NU and victims. He notes when they first tried to meet with Gerwani members and go to the houses of former PKI members and associated people, they were politely rejected. 59 On the other hand, the families of some activists within Syarikat also continue to feel it is dangerous to mix with, let alone advocate for, former Cordaid, Strategy 2007 -2010 , 'Walk That Extra Mile', 2006 http://www.cordaid.com. 57 Ibid, p.14. leftists. 60 As a result some researchers have chosen to conceal their involvement from their families. This gives some indication of the continuing sensitivity of the issue of 1965 in NU circles, which I will return to later.
SYARIKAT'S MISSION AND ACTIVITIES
Syarikat's larger aims are to reconcile survivors of the violence and the NU as an organisation, to rehabilitate survivors, to advocate for their rights by legal means and to engage in alternative truth telling. Syarikat's program centres on 'building a peaceful and democratic Indonesia'.
61 They aim to strengthen society's social fabric and preventing future conflict.
62 Although they use the term reconciliation to describe their work, more specifically I believe they focus on the goal of achieving co-existence by enhancing bonds across two groups of people that have in some cases purposely isolated themselves from the other for almost forty years. Chayes and Minnow define the goal of co-existence as 'cooperation across' previous lines of division and driven by programs in the fields of arts, education and economic development.
63
Consistent with the goal of co-existence Syarikat have tried to foster co-operation, in multiple ways, between members of the NU and victims. many years and experienced physical violence and sexual and psychological violence. They reported that they and their children still experienced discrimination. They blamed the Indonesian state for cementing feelings of hatred and suspicion of them. 68 They also felt what they experienced impacted negatively on the struggle of younger women and on the solidarity of the women's movement. 69 In interviews with me, several women victims suggested that being listened to and forming links with the younger generation were very important to them.
70
For Syarikat, the focus on women victims only began in 2005, after realising that many of the victim's groups with which they worked, were dominated by men. As a result of this gender composition, women were not speaking out or even joining their activities. 71 The most likely reason for this is the intense demonization of members of the leftist women's organisation Gerwani. State produced versions of official history claimed Gerwani women were involved in the torture, genital mutilation and murder of the military men killed in the 1965 coup attempt. This propaganda resulted in effective pariah status for formers Gerwani members. After some encouragement from a woman activist, Syarikat began to realise how strong a stigma these women attached to formal organisations and hence the reluctance of some to join or contribute.
72 Syarikat then turned their attention to projects that focused specifically on women survivors from 1965 and especially debunking myths about Gerwani.
Syarikat has also assisted survivors in the task of economic development. In 2005, for example, Syarikat worked together with the Yogyakarta NGO, Education Forum for Human Rights Defence (FOPPERHAM, Forum Pendidikan dan Perjuangan Hak Asasi Manusia), to assist women from the women's survivor organization Women's Progress (Kiprah Perempuan,) to form a savings and loan co-operative. 73 When an earthquake hit Yogyakarta in May 2006, it damaged the homes of several victims of 1965. Syarikat helped build transitional housing and launched a program together with local prominent people, architects and volunteers from Syarikat to rebuild the houses of the poor. They also organised help for women victims of 1965 affected by the quake. 74 In other cases they have helped victims' groups set up small health clinics for their members.
Syarikat has also attempted to enhance co-existence by means of education, based on their view that a singular version of the past, has worked to cement anti-communism and thus distrust of those formerly imprisoned in 1965. 75 Earlier in the reformasi era some victims and historians, used the term meluruskan sejarah, meaning straightening out of history to refer to the need to debunk New Order historiography and provide a new, perhaps singular, narrative 68 Ibid, p. 6. 69 Ibid. of the national past. In the interim years since this time, this term has been subject to critique especially by younger Indonesian scholars, who recognising its past negative effects, question the usefulness or need for any kind of national or singular history.
76
To describe their efforts at publicising the stories of survivors of the violence of 1965, Syarikat use the term balancing out history (memberimbangkan sejarah). This suggests the need for more balanced versions of history or at least alternative versions of history, without suggesting that one singular narrative is necessary. This follows from the postmodern rejection of meta-narratives of history, but the term balancing out history also implies a sense of more truthful versions of the past. This fits quite well with what Tessa Morris Suzuki has termed historical truthfulness, by which she refers to the need in cases of violence for greater weight to narratives that acknowledge, versus deny, violence.
77
To balance out history, Syarikat relies heavily on personal accounts from survivors. This practice approximates the globalised practices of both oral history as a means of recording previously marginalised versions of history and also and language of truth telling prevalent in truth commissions. Several scholars such as Shaw and Mendeloff have criticised the assumed benefits of truth-telling or narrating one's past for victims and associated assumptions about speaking as a form of healing and even questioned the contribution of truth telling to achieving peace. 78 The specifics of the case of 1965, however, in which versions of the coup attempt were used for almost forty years to demonise all leftists means that revealing other versions of the past including through the means of survivors speaking out, is crucial. According to the New Order version of the coup attempt, for example, members of the PKI, the People's Youth and Gerwani, not only murdered the army leadership, but also mutilated their bodies. This version of events, which is not supported by evidence, was replicated in the narrative at the Sacred Pancasila Monument in the accompanying museum in reportage surrounding the annual commemorative day of 1 October, in the national film The Betrayal of the 30 September Movement/PKI and in school history textbooks. 79 This narrative of the coup attempt, combined with bans on former political prisoners and their children from working in the civil service, as teachers and journalists and freedom of movement produced an enduring stigma towards members of the left.
To promote alternative truth telling, Syarikat have facilitated discussions in which university students hear directly from survivors about their experiences. One sociology program at Atmajaya University in Yogyakarta, for example, focuses on marginalized community members, by asking them to talk to students about their views. Lacking from all these films is historicisation of the wider political landscape of the 1960s. It is unclear, for example, who was targeted in this violence and why. In Sinengker, there are only vague allusions to the main protagonist's brother following the PKI by means of him handing her a sickle made out of artistically woven bamboo leaves. In the documentaries, many women say they were members of Gerwani, but do not discuss what Gerwani did or stood for. In her observations of historical memory in Latin America, Ines Izaguierre similarly suggests that there is an erasure of the memory of politics in attempts to represent the past.
82
Why is this so? It may be that Syarikat are trying to resist any kind of narration about the events such that audiences decide for themselves. Alternatively they might feel less comfortable about exposing this past, because they are primarily motivated by a sense of compassion for these long marginalised people, rather than necessarily sharing the same political ideas as survivors. Without any discussion of the larger context of their suffering, however, it is difficult to understand these women's experiences and one might expect that young audiences, who are unlikely to know much about this period due to New Order censorship, will be left with vague ideas about why Gerwani and the broader left were targeted in this violence.
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'Tragedi 65 Jadi Pelajaran Berharga ', RUAS December Edition, 2007, p. 12. 81 Under the direction of Syarikat and the National Commission on Women's Rights students from high schools in these two cities were invited to write an opinion piece about the history of women in Indonesia for submission to a panel of judges. The winning entrants were then invited to a workshop where they made six short documentary films on women former political prisoners that were then screened in Indonesian high schools. 
SYARIKAT'S MAGAZINE RUAS
Another key aspect of their alternative truth telling projects is Syarikat's bi-monthly magazine called RUAS, which commenced in September 2001. The print run for RUAS magazine is usually around 1500 and it is primarily read by people in Java, the heartland of the NU. It is also sent to the NU Islamic boarding schools, survivors, victims' organisations and libraries for wider reading and to members of parliament to keep this issue on their minds.
Each edition of the magazine includes stories of survivors from 1965, mostly those who were imprisoned for some time. In the past RUAS has profiled the stories of many from Gerwani, the People's Youth, BTI and also members of many different leftist organisations such as teacher and trade unions and student organisations, that were accused by default of involvement in the coup attempt because of their organisational links to the PKI. The articles in RUAS are very short and for this reason and perhaps editorial decisions, the focus of most victims' accounts is their life just before they were captured and then in prison and once released. In some cases like that of land reform there is some attempt at an explanation about what happened before 1965, 83 but in most cases little context is provided.
As in the case of Syarikat's documentary films, by emphasising the suffering of these people and hence their experiences after being arrested, Syarikat aims to humanise these people in the eyes of what they hope is a wide readership across the NU. A key aim of Syarikat is to challenge the propaganda according to which all leftists are barbaric and not to be trusted. Yet such a focus obfuscates any sense of agency on the part of survivors. The focus only on imprisonment means that again politics is erased from these representations. There is no broader discussion in RUAS of the role of the Left in the 1960s.
A central cause for hesitancy over how to represent the pre-1965 pasts of survivors is the tension between Syarikat's joint goals of advocacy for victims and historical revision. In an examination of how the language of human rights fits with or clashes with the project of history writing, Jelin has observed that a human rights framework demands a polarity between victim and perpetrator and that as a result a victim is depicted only as 'a passive being, harmed by the actions of others. The victim is never an active agent.' 84 This is one reason for the absence of discussion of the political identities of survivors of the violence. This is a clear tension in Syarikat's work and also in self representations made by survivors.
In his analysis of the first few years of RUAS, Budiawan suggests that RUAS was well received by victims who see the accounts by victims here 'like a clear mirror' reflecting their own experiences. He also claimed that people within NU may also read this as form of reprimand. 85 The erasure of the political identities of survivors may antagonise some in the NU, but discussing the pre-1965 past may prove equally damaging to Syarikat's primary goal of improving relations between these two communities. Promoting particular versions of events before 1965, that detail for example the political activism of most and the methods used in this activism might lead to new controversies. On this point another noticeable 86 This is important because of the limited funding of many victims' organisations such as these which means they are often unable to sustain their own regular publications.
87 By profiling these organisations it keeps them and their activities visible to other survivors. It also enhances networks across the twenty-six towns represented by those in the Syarikat network.
RUAS provides fairly regular coverage of legal developments and continuing barriers with regard to human rights and implications for victims of 1965, and has tracked the progress of the now failed Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 88 Although there were promising signs between 1998 and 2000, anti-communist actions and rhetoric increased after Wahid's proposal to lift the ban on communism in the form of sweeps of leftist books in bookstores, intimidation of vocal former political prisoners and concerted efforts to prevent revisions to the national history curricula and the long standing version of the 1965 coup attempt as communist backed. A small victory was the Constitutional Court's decision in early 2004 to overturn the ban on former PKI members running in elections, but many victims and NGOs viewed the rejection of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2006 as a major setback. By reporting on ongoing reconciliation meetings and new initiatives from its twenty six member organisations, the magazine continues to give a sense of momentum to those who want this past, at the very least, acknowledged.
RESPONSES TO SYARIKAT AND EFFORTS TO RE-EXAMINE 1965
In addition to contributions from survivors and members of the Syarikat network, RUAS has also profiled the views of several prominent Indonesians about 1965 and how it should be resolved. The contributions of people with more influence are important for survivors to feel this issue is receiving some attention and secondly for readers from the NU, who may remain suspicious of people from the left, to hear alternative views from Muslim leaders about 1965. In the last four years, for example, RUAS has published interviews with Kamala Chandrakirana ( ', RUAS, Edition 7, 2003, pp. 8-11. 87 YPKP then LPKP in Jakarta for example began the publication Soeara Kita in 1999, but to my knowledge this publication is now very irregular due to a lack of funding and more perhaps more pressing needs of victims, like medical support. were young at the time of the coup so have some knowledge of what it was like, but were not yet political at the time.
The three women contributors to RUAS, Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, 89 Kamala Chandrakirana, 90 and Sinta Nuriyah Abdurrahman Wahid, 91 who are all advocates of women's rights, were extremely sympathetic to victims of the violence, especially members of Gerwani and other women who suffered. They expressed strong support for Syarikat's work especially efforts to challenge New Order historiography. Such endorsement from people outside of their own organisations is important for the purposes of both protection and access to NU leaders, who are more likely to be able to influence the NU's wider membership.
The views expressed in RUAS, by two male leaders within the NU are, however, more indicative of wider views of Syarikat within the NU. They are characterised by expressions of support, but also questions about Syarikat's focus. Writing in RUAS in 2003 as a member of NU's National Religious Council (Syuriah), Kiai Masdar F. Mas'udi, 92 begins his contribution with an expression of support for Syarikat. He reiterates the appeal at the 1999 NU Congress for members of the NU to engage in repentance (taubat) and utterances for God's forgiveness (istigfar).
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He commends Syarikat for their work, but notes they will not easily be accepted by the mainstream of the NU. He also links the violence of 1965 with the violence carried out by Pesindo troops following the Madiun Affair of 1948 claiming from the NU's perspective:
1948 will be raised because they say there were many victims from the Islamic side. 1948 could be seen as the cause of 1965, so it is not fair to just accuse the NU of being involved in 1965.
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He acknowledges the scale of 1948 was more limited (several villages were targeted versus half a million people), but claims it will always be brought up, 'People often say they had already killed us. So it is not surprising in 1965 people said it was a matter of kill or be killed.' 95 Said Aqiel, who is more sympathetic to Syarikat, makes the same parallel with 1948. 96 Both men are correct in stating that 1948 is a common reference point amongst members of the NU who defend the violence of 1965, but the frequently flouted idea that in 1965 people 89 Nursyahbani Katjasungkana (Pengacara dan Aktivis Perempuan) Kembalikan Identitas Mereka sebagai Perempuan yang Utuh', RUAS, Edition 13, 2004, pp. 4-6. 90 'Kamala Chandra (Komnas Perempuan) Kita harus Terus Menggugat dan Menggugah', RUAS Edition 16, 2004, pp. 3-6. 91 'Hj Sinta Nuriyah Abdurrahman Wahid: Korban terberat adalah Perempuan, ' RUAS Edition 16, 2004, pp. 4-5. 92 Masdar was once hailed as a leading reformer in the NU From this perspective his comments in RUAS are disappointing. van Bruinessen, 1994, pp. 221-222. 93 'KH Masdar F Mas'udi Katib Syuriah PBNU 'Semua Pihak Terlibat Harus Duduk Bersama', RUAS, Edition 7, 2003, p. 4. 94 Ibid, p. 5. 95 Ibid, p. 5. acted only because it was a case of 'kill or be killed', or fears of a repeat of Madiun must be seriously examined. As indicated in the documents and literature surveyed above, support from within the NU was more systematic and orchestrated than this suggests.
There is a tendency not just from wider sections of the NU, but sometimes also from Syarikat to adopt the more comfortable narrative that 'we were all victims' and that members of the NU were fully manipulated by the military. Masrukin, from Lakpesdam NU, noted that in the 2002 goodwill gathering in Blitar between victims and older members of the NU 'an understanding emerged that the two sides had been made into enemies for the purposes of those in power'. 97 Based on their research, Syarikat also concludes that the violence of 1965 was vertical and not horizontal in origin and thus state directed. 98 It is critical to understand the role of the military in directing the violence of 1965-66, but members of the NU were by no means victims in the same way that members of the left were. They were not the subject of mass purges, they and their families were not terrorised both during the period of violence, in prison and for most of the New Order regime. They did not have their property destroyed or taken, and most did not lose members of their family, unless they were members of the left. They did not have restrictions on their rights for the last four decades and in some cases they benefited politically or materially from participating in this violence. In this way they are, as Morris-Suzuki notes, also implicated in this history of violence, by means of direct or inherited benefits resulting from the violence. 101 Then in 2004, he hosted a national dialogue between ulama and those who identified themselves as families of victims of the communists in both Madiun in 1948 and in 1965. 102 The exhibitions and dialogue were intended to stem any sympathy felt towards victims of the post-coup violence and to prevent concessions to them. A key theme in these efforts was to reject the portrayal of former political prisoners, or those 97 'Mengupayakan Rekonsiliasi Lewat Diaolog, Seni dan Kerja Bakti', RUAS Edition 24, p. 14. who died in the mass killings, as victims and instead to suggest Muslims were the victims of communist violence.
Prior to his death, Yusuf Hasyim who was also the head of the Tebuireng pesantren in Jombang, East Java killed leftists following the Madiun Affair of 1948. He claimed he narrowly escaped the attacks on kiai and pesantrens by leftist troops. 103 He also played a key role in Banser in the early 1960s and participated in and directed the killing campaigns in Java. Hasyim was very angered by the work of Syarikat. In 2006 he held a seminar at Tebuireng pesantren to discuss the Law on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Members of Syarikat were invited to attend this meeting, but when they arrived they were made to listen to arguments about why a commission was not necessary.
104
The current General Chairman of the NU is Hasyim Muzadi. Muzadi was born in Tuban East Java in 1949 and was thus sixteen years old at the time of the coup attempt, but he claims he did not become a member of Ansor until 1975. Muzadi was evasive in our interview and did not want to talk at length about the violence of 1965. He claims he supports the idea of cultural reconciliation, by which he means informal reconciliation, but he claims Syarikat does not have clear aims. 105 He was prepared to state that the full rights of former political prisoners should be restored and that the children of victims should not be discriminated against.
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In more candid comments in his opening speech to members of the 2004 dialogue of victims of the PKI, Muzadi canvassed the revival and rehabilitation of 'the extreme left wing' in the reform era. He expressed concerns about the attempts of organizations right down to the village level to agitate to open this past, claiming that they would only make past wounds worse.
107 He was referring here presumably to victims' groups such as YPKP and LPKP that have representation throughout Indonesia and which are conducting research on this past and demanding different forms of redress for this past. In our interview, Muzadi also claimed that the PKI had been 'planning a genocide'. 108 Here he touches on another idea frequently circulated that the communists had dug holes everywhere in preparation for further killings after the 1965 coup attempt.
109 Senior and influential NU leader, Kiai Muchith Muzadi, Hasyim Muzadi's brother also argued that if the communists were allowed to continue their political program in 1965, the majority of Indonesians would have been slaughtered. 110 The Chairman of the NU thus is sceptical about the benefits of opening this past and indeed speaks in more closed discussions about fears of former political prisoners gaining too much influence. Underlying this concern is a wider fear of members of the NU being prosecuted for their roles in 1965.
In 2006 following the rejection of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by the Constitutional Court, Syarikat were subject to more direct and open criticism perhaps in an attempt to end any further exploration of the NU's role in the events of 1965-66. In May 2007 the East Java NU magazine, AULA, devoted most of an edition of their magazine to theme of the contemporary revival of the PKI. The magazine included attacks on both Abdurrahman Wahid and on organisations viewed as products of his liberalism. 111 The criticisms of Syarikat and Lakspesdam NU in this magazine are more explicit. Abdul Wahid Asa, the magazine editor who is deputy head of the NU in East Java and a member of Commission C in the regional East Java parliament recounted his experience of the aggressiveness of the PKI in the land seizures of 1964. He recalled how in these situations Ansor naturally defended the haji (those who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca, a mark of being a santri) and then after the coup, crushed the PKI. The author goes on to say that forty years later in 2007, many NU youth who had never witnessed these events blame their parents and defend the PKI. Their excuse is for the sake of human rights. These kids are just the victims arising from the failure to absorb the meaning of birrul-walidin (Arabic for being loyal to one's parents) and fell for the propaganda of the communists for the sake of a few bank notes and pretending to defend human rights.
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This is a direct slight at young members of the NU involved with both Syarikat. Senior NU member Abdul Muchith Muzadi similarly stated that he could not understand the attitude of the young, 'because Islam -particularly the NU was the PKI's foremost enemy in the 1960s'.
113 For these men it is as if those within Syarikat have betrayed their elders, if not their own parents.
Another article in the magazine entitled 'NU Cadres Infiltrated' referred to the shock felt by several NU leaders in East Java when they discovered that the NU was linked to the publication RUAS and that the editor-in-chief (Imam Aziz) was a 'central leader of the Lakpesdam and an important figure in LKIS Yogya'.
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The backlash against Syarikat reflects a broader shift towards conservatism in the NU, which has accompanied their return to politics. In a recent article exploring the direction the NU has followed since the fall of Suharto, Greg Fealy challenged the view that the return to the khittah represented a long term withdrawal from politics and a long term new direction for the NU. 115 He claims NU has not used the post-1998 freedoms to expand and develop its reform agenda, but has instead abandoned many of the causes that it so enthusiastically embraced in the preceding fifteen years. 118 This criticism could apply to Syarikat who indeed seek to challenge the views of many ulama concerning 1965, but also many others in NU who are committed to Islamic liberalism. Muzadi also spoke of the need for further acculturation within Islam in Indonesia such that certain practices like people claiming to be prophets or praying in two languages (meaning languages other than Arabic) needed to be challenged. 119 Interestingly Syarikat have tried to avoid a focus on Islam as a religion and its theological dimensions, in both their magazine RUAS and in their wider activities. 120 This most likely stems from a broader commitment to pluralism shared by others in this younger generation and an understanding that some survivors of the violence are not Muslim and indeed some converted from Islam to other religions after their experiences in 1965. 121 It may be related to an understanding, that many victims still feel hostile towards Islam as a religion given the impression that Muslims played a large role in the killings. 122 In 2007, however, Syarikat broke with the past and felt compelled to address the issue of religion and variations of belief in one edition of RUAS. The reason for this focus is not clearly explained by the editor, but a few months before this edition, in September the Indonesian Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) pronounced a fatwa declaring Al Qiyadah Islamiyah, a group with support in Bogor and Padang led by Ahmad Moshaddeq who claims to be a prophet, as sesat, or having deviated from the proper path of Islam. 123 In this edition of RUAS Syarikat interviewed a member of the Blitar branch of Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), an organisation renowned for carrying out raids on bars and nightclubs and destroying associated property. Ganang Edi Widodo, unsurprisingly, expressed his support for the MUI fatwa. He went further to claim that Al Qiyadah Islamiyah are not the only one's to have lost their way, 'the Catholics have, the Christians have, Buddhists and Hindus have. The Jews are a group whom Allah is angry with'. He goes on to say that 'Anyone who sees a disavowal and does not try to change it is satan '. 124 This article is countered with interviews from members of the NU in various positions including an NGO activist Zaenal Rosyadi (head of the Islamic Anti-Discrimination Network) and Kiai Mohammad Hadi Mahfudz, all of whom disagree with the fatwa and with the idea that Islam allows violence. 125 In making their comments they made direct references to passages in the Qu'ran.
Syarikat decided to deal with this issue perhaps because they are realising that in order to continue their own cause, they need to counter groups, including those within NU, that challenge their commitment to pluralism and more liberal interpretations of Islam. Looking back at 1965 when people's faith or alleged commitment to Islam became a deciding factor in whether they survived or not, it is particularly important that this kind of classification of belief is not imposed on people. Indeed, the 1966 indoctrination materials targeted at Muslim youths described those involved in the coup attempt by the exact word sesat, because they allegedly did not believe in God. 126 This kind of critique has become even more important given pressure from the MUI and other Islamist groups and some within the NU, to ban the followers of Ahmadiyah, a group that believes that there was another prophet after Mohammad, from practising their beliefs.
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Syarikat may also want to reinforce to readers their own stance on this and related issues. They regularly profile in RUAS like-minded NU linked organizations in the Syarikat network that are working to create and defend pluralism in society. In 2004, for example, they profiled a Syarikat network organisation Colony for Open Society (KOLMASTER-Koloni Masyarakat Terbuka), a group formed in 2001 by NU youth in Wonosobo, Central Java who felt society has fragmented along primordial lines since reformasi, characterised by narrow thinking on religion, race, ethnicity and between political parties.
128 KOLMASTER celebrates openness in society and disseminate information about democracy, pluralism, inclusivity, gender equality and protection of minority rights.
In the broader picture of human rights advocacy, the case of Syarikat demonstrates that in the post-Suharto era, in addition to longstanding barriers to human rights reform including a strong military and weak judiciary there are also new challenges. Although post-Suharto governments have to some extent embraced the language of democracy and human rights and half-heartedly overseen some human rights investigations, NGOs now operate in a much more complex political landscape. Syarikat is the product of a long-reaching reform program in NU, based on liberal interpretations of Islam. This reform process took place in the context of limited political space for the expression of alternative versions of Indonesian Islam. Since the fall of Suharto, liberal Islam has been subject to strong critiques on the basis that it is a Westernized or secularised version of Islam. In the context of increased emphasis on Islamic symbolism, Syarikat has found itself isolated and rejected from the support base from which it sprang.
Syarikat is very much the product of Wahid's thinking and follows his position of sympathy for victims of the violence of 1965, and for this reasons it has also been targeted as a legacy of his influence. The connections between Syarikat's work and Wahid have also become complicated. During his presidency Wahid departed markedly from his stated commitment to human rights and tolerance by condoning violent acts by his supporters when he faced impeachment in 2001. 129 In addition to developing many enemies outside of NU, his continuing ambitions within NU since his term as president have also worked to fuel a backlash against his influence in NU including organisations seen to represent his vision. This is another reason for wariness towards Syarikat from some within NU.
In his research on Syarikat, completed in 2002, Budiawan argued that Syarikat's work had the potential to shatter deeply entrenched anti-communism in Indonesia. 130 This may continue hold true for the younger generations in Indonesia, who have not invested in one version of 1965, but there are still people who wish to keep anti-communism alive and who to continue to marginalise survivors of 1965. Responses to Syarikat reveal a growing tide of conservatism and decreased tolerance in the NU. Syarikat's efforts to address the economic needs of survivors by establishing co-operatives are very important given the limited means of many survivors. They also provide an important support and advocacy network for survivors. The connections established between those in the Syarikat network, who are mostly young members of the NU and survivors are the most enduring. Other efforts to promote co-existence with older members of NU through goodwill meetings and other actions may be having slower and less noticeable effects on improving community relations.
The Syarikat network of activists is evidence that some within the NU remain committed to reform and helping marginalised members of society. Although Syarikat was founded partly in reaction to the negative stigma attached to Ansor, members of the Syarikat network continue to advocate for victims eight years since the founding of Syarikat suggesting they are genuinely concerned about the plight of survivors. By gradually changing attitudes, particularly amongst young people, about the old left in Indonesia, Syarikat is helping to rehabilitate survivors and improve reception towards former political prisoners in society. Many survivors value the opportunity to be listened to finally and feel in the current climate that history is the one arena where they have a chance to at least challenge previous views. Syarikat negotiates this task of historical revision delicately, choosing to avoid discussion of the political identities and activities of people targeted in the violence of 1965, in preference for first achieving the goal of rehabilitation of survivors by exposing their extreme suffering. Syarikat provides an important case study of how the goals of peace and historical revision can be accommodated.
